the problem: Co-production, Determination, and the
Conceptualization of Lively Capital
The title "Lively Capital" is meant to point in two distinct directions. As with all workshops, this one purported to cover a topical area-broadly speaking, that of the convergence of the life sciences with systems and regimes of capital. In that register, the title refers concretely to the ways in which the life sciences are increasingly incorporated into market regimes. This is an institutional movement, away from the university and toward the market, which has been particularly marked in the American context since the late 1970s and early 1980s, and has, in the process, seen the university itself become a more entrepreneurial institutional space, one that explicitly encourages the commercialization of "basic" research conducted within its confines.
This corporatization of the life sciences can be traced back to the beginnings of the biotechnology industry, which was marked by the concomitant emergence of new types of science and technology with changes in the legal, regulatory, and market structures that shaped the conduct of that technoscience. The "new" technoscience was recombinant DNA technology (rDt), a set of techniques, developed in 1973 by Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen, that allows the dissection and splicing of DNA molecules in laboratories. rDt allows the life sciences to become "technological," where the product is cellular or molecular matter such as DNA or protein. Some of these proteins could, in principle, have therapeutic effects (especially for diseases that are caused by, or have as a central symptom, an abnormal amount of that protein) and be produced industrially.
While rDt was a necessary condition for the development of the biotech industry, the emergence of a new technology could hardly in itself be considered sufficient cause for the emergence of an entirely new industrial segment, which can only be understood as a consequence of the conjuncture of several events and factors. First, venture capitalists were willing to invest in a technology that had little credibility at the time as a successful business model. Second, the U.S. federal government spent an enormous amount of money on basic biomedical research through funding of the National Institutes of Health (NIh) consequent to the declaration of a war on cancer in the early 1970s.1 Third, the Bayh-Dole Act, a piece of legislation enacted in 1980, facilitated the transfer of technology between academe and industry in the United States, and thereby enabled rapid commercialization of basic research problems. Fourth, a supportive legal climate allowed the protection of intellectual property in biotechnologies, marked, for instance, by the landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in 1980, which allowed patent rights on a genetically engineered microorganism that could break down crude-oil spills. Since the 1990s, the increasingly naturalized corporatization of the life sciences has become a more global phenomenon, often explicitly or implicitly imitating events, models, or transformations that had occurred or been established in the United States, though hardly ever in seamless or homogenous fashion.
The emergence of the entrepreneurial university; the corporatization of the life sciences; the naturalization of this corporatization. Crudely speaking, this is the historical trajectory of the last four decades or so, within which this volume is located. This trajectory is neither predetermined nor uncomplicated.
I wish to illustrate this through a brief account of Stanford University's technology-transfer office, which is implicated in transformations that, over the past four decades, have helped set the stage for this volume. Stanford is often regarded as the exemplary entrepreneurial university, especially in the context of the life sciences. Its office of technology transfer was established as early as 1970, and the university's aggressive commercialization of its technologies has been seen as a huge spur to the overall commercialization of biotechnology, and specifically to the development of Silicon Valley. While Stanford, like many other universities, had before that an office of sponsored projects, which negotiated research contracts with sponsors, the development of a full-fledged technology-licensing office that focused exclusively on marketing university inventions was instigated by the entrepreneurial spirit of a particular associate director of the sponsored-projects office, Niels Reimers. Patenting university inventions was not a new phenomenonwhat was at stake was institutionalizing and streamlining this process in a way that turned commercialization into an administrative priority for the university; generating expertise on patenting, often by outsourcing patent activities to patent law firms; and creating incentives for university scientists to prioritize the commercialization of their research.2
Stanford was not the only university to adopt a more entrepreneurial approach in the 1970s (though most technology-transfer offices in the United States were set up after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, in 1980). But the history of its office of technology licensing (otl) is intrinsically linked to the history of biotechnology, and especially to the history of commercial biotechnology. Stanford's otl was involved in getting a patent on Boyer's and Cohen's recombinant DNA technology, the most lucrative technology that Stanford licensed during that period. 3 Crucially, there were two major consequences of models such as those adopted by Stanford. First, a greater degree of collaborative research between university and industry was established (since the university retained upstream patent rights, as opposed to a "more open" or "less commercial" model, wherein patents were usually on more downstream applications and tended to reside exclusively with industries that utilized technologies in the public domain for specific product development). Second, a "spin-off " culture ensued, whereby university professors commercialized their research by starting their own companies.
By providing this potted history of Stanford's technology-transfer office, I mean to suggest that the emergence of the entrepreneurial (American) university, the corporatization of the life sciences, and the naturalization of that corporatization are complex processes. It is not the case that life sciences research before the 1970s was noncommercial, or that universities were uninterested in marketable technologies. Rather, what one sees is the changing nature and locus of "commercialization" from that time, with the university becoming a more explicit-and institutionally regulatedstakeholder in the entire process.
The consequences of commercialization are also not self-evident, because commercialization does not imply a predetermined set of actions or outcomes. Rather, the forms and modes of commercialization constitute a terrain of deeply strategic maneuver and contestation. A patent in itself does not determine the way university technologies are disseminated. All that it allows is for the patent holder to negotiate the market terrain with a certain set of exclusive rights that others in the marketplace do not possess.
The dissemination of rDt is itself instructive in this regard. Stanford decided to issue nonexclusive licenses, an approach that allowed the university simultaneously to reap enormous commercial benefit and to promote wide distribution of the technology, the latter ensuring that Stanford fulfilled the public-service function deemed appropriate for a public institution. 4 At many points along the way, Stanford pursued strategies that were in fact antithetical to a profit motive.5 For instance, in addition to the original recombinant DNA patent that was granted in 1980, Stanford also acquired two subsequent patents, in 1984 and 1988, which covered products generated by downstream application of rDt, in prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells, respectively. In the normal course, these patents would have expired in 2001 and 2005, thereby effectively extending the length of time for which rDt patents would generate revenue for the patent holders. However, Stanford allowed the subsequent patents to expire along with the original rDt patent, in 1997. Furthermore, Stanford decided not to charge royalties to nonprofit organizations to which it licensed rDt.
The story of the rDt license suggests the potentially immense malleability of property regimes; hence, adopting a moralistic position on intellectual property is often unhelpful in responding to the actual political complexities that are enshrined within the idea and practice of commercialization.6 But the story also points to a moment of deep ferment, wherein granting a patent on a platform technology took six years. The legitimacy of the patent was deeply debated, and the role of the university (including the private university) as existing for the public good was largely deemed nonnegotiable. Thus, in referring to a certain historical trajectory that the value system of the life sciences has traversed over the past four decades, I do not mean to present a simplified narrative in which the private encroaches on the public, nor do I intend to suggest that the outcomes of such an encroachment are inevitable or known in advance. But I do want to suggest that questions about commercialization-which are, among other things, about the legitimate extent of commodification, the role of the university, and the value system of science-were deeply unsettled less than three decades ago, yet seem largely beyond argument today, certainly in the United States. What is crucial here is the changing investment in the market by the value system of the life sciences-which, in spite of numerous contingencies and open-ended, strategic negotiations, has nonetheless seen a trajectory that is resolutely more embracing of market logics over time. Even if historical trajectories are emergent and not predetermined, the fact that they have consistently unfolded in certain institutional and ideological directions over others-and not just in the United States, but in other parts of the world as well-is important to note and assess.
Stanford's rDt licensing is a useful point of departure for describing the terrain of this volume for a number of reasons. The first, quite simply, is its historical importance. rDt in many ways provided the technological conditions of possibility for biotechnology, and the mechanisms of its dissemination (which had everything to do with Stanford's strategy of nonexclusive licensing) were consequential for the development of the biotech industry. In addition, Stanford's approach to licensing exemplifies both the frictioned commercialization of the life sciences and, more broadly, the emergence of new normative systems that are more open to such commercialization. On the one hand, one sees the (at the time) contested question of the appropriate relationship of university science to commercialization, with Boyer and Cohen themselves being initially wary of the rDt patent application and thus deploying the patent, once issued, in a manner that ensured the public dissemination of the technology. On the other hand, Stanford's move toward patenting the technology in the first place, and the movement of its technology-licensing office in a distinctly entrepreneurial direction, indicates a moment of changing value systems in the sciences, away from a Mertonian disinterestedness or communism.7
This direction was evident in at least three ways. First, the public dissemination of a technology, while it undeniably provided access to that technology in the public domain, was also a spur to private industry. Stanford's investment as a university in the life sciences, combined with its entrepreneurial strategies of technology licensing, was undoubtedly a factor in the biotech boom in Silicon Valley. Second, self-questioning about the advisability of patenting, evident in the rDt case, eventually dissipated, as commercial enterprise came to seem like a natural course of action for university scientists. And third, Stanford to some extent emerged as a model of the entrepreneurial university, even though its mechanisms of technology transfer, which favored public dissemination of the technology, were not necessarily adopted. Over the past three decades, it has in fact become the norm for American universities to have technology-transfer offices that aggressively pursue intellectual property in the life sciences.
Stanford itself, in its actions in the rDt case, was adhering not just to the public-service function of the university, but also to the spirit of the patent regime, which is to promote the public disclosure of inventions by providing the inventor with a set of property rights. In other words, the idea (and ideal) of the public is already enshrined in the very rationale of a patent, as a particular form of intellectual property that acts in the interest of public disclosure and dissemination. That this ideal so often manifests in ways that instead protect institutional interests in the face of market competition, making Stanford's actions seem almost surprising or altruistic, is itself an indication of the way in which the commercialization of the life sciences has become naturalized. Exemplifying patent strategy as protectionist rather disseminating is Hoffmann-La Roche's patent on polymerase chain reaction (pcr), a technology considered in many ways as seminal as rDt for the development of biotechnology. Roche aggressively enforced the pcr patent, thereby arguably creating value for themselves without the same consideration for accessible downstream applicability that Stanford showed. Roche's approach to technology patents is perhaps by now seen as more normative than Stanford's. While both institutions engage in the commercialization of technologies, they play out market logics in decidedly different ways.
The territory of this volume is hardly limited to the playing out of intellectual-property regimes. It is more generally concerned with the nature of value systems in the life sciences, how they are perceived and deployed. What is crucial here is that, over time and more globally, the investment in market logics has been seen as variously inevitable, nonnegotiable, desirable, or even virtuous, even as market logics may themselves be contradictory. By situating the case of Stanford against that of Roche, one detects adherence both to public dissemination and to private monopolization, based on the same instruments of intellectual property. Nevertheless, whether they be more liberal or more monopolistic in inclination, both logics operate under the sign of the market, of capitalist exchange and value. Historical contingency, therefore, arises at the level of particular strategies and tactics adopted as the life sciences have been incorporated within systems and regimes of capital. This historical contingency has occurred in the shadow of an ideological embrace of the market that, while not seamless, has become increasingly uncontested over time.8
In other words, the fundamental nature of the market, its value systems and epistemologies, is itself shifting, in what might broadly be considered a "neoliberal" direction. Neoliberalism is often used as a catch-all phrase, simultaneously encompassing too much and describing too little. Yet there are uncanny overlaps between the development of life-science epistemologies and the epistemologies of neoliberal economics since the early 1970s, as Melinda Cooper (2008) has elegantly demonstrated. This is not a relationship of cause and effect-the life sciences do not change because of neoliberalism, nor is neoliberalism a consequence of the biotechnology revolution. Rather, what one can trace is an emergent epistemic milieu in which both economics/capitalism and the life sciences/biotechnology are undergoing radical transformation and dealing with apparently similar types of problem-spaces (such as, for instance, the understanding and management of complex systems of risk) at similar moments in time, and often drawing on one another for metaphoric or epistemic sustenance. Even the ideology of innovation, which gained enormous traction under Ronald Reagan's presidency, in the 1980s, under the influence of neoliberal thinkers such as George Gilder (1981), suggests a value system of capitalism that is in some ways quite distinct from that which Marx traced during the industrial revolution, whereby the magic of capital lies not in the creation of the surplus through the apparent exchange of equivalents, but rather in the creation of what Michael Lewis (1999) refers to as "the new new thing." Innovation as a driving force of capital draws to a large degree on technoscientific potential for value generation; technoscientific potential for value generation is fundamentally enabled by a political-economic regime that provides incentives to innovate. Rather than cause and effect, what one is confronted with are mutually implicated and emergent epistemologies and systems concerning life and value, what Sheila Jasanoff (2004, 2005a ) has termed co-production.
While much is changing and emergent, what has remained constant, or intensified, is a set of mutual investments-the investments of the market in the life sciences, and the investments of the life sciences in the market. The co-productionist sensibility of this volume is complicated by this deep mutual investment, which does lead to the life sciences being increasingly "driven" by market logics, so that even when actions are apparently taken in the public good (as by Stanford with regard to rDt), the parameters of those actions make sense in terms of the market and of capital. I wish here to elaborate on this complication.
I do so, specifically, by reading Jasanoff against Marx, as an entry point into a more general problem of theory and method that this volume wrestles with. This reading, at one level, is not necessarily representative of all the chapters in the volume, which explicitly draw on or engage with either or both of these theorists to varying degrees, or not at all. But such a reading situates a problem-space that I feel all the chapters do occupy, regardless of their specific modality of engagement with it. These next reflections, therefore, are more authorial than representative, speaking to my own thinking through of problems of theory and method. I will revert to a more editorial role in a subsequent section.
On the one hand, by bringing in the notion of co-production, I want to reform a certain kind of Marxian analytics that is economically determinist. To reduce changes in the biosciences to economic causes would be inadequate. At the same time, I do not wish to suggest that co-production simply implies complexity or contingency. I am wary of a certain current anthropological move that seems to posit the establishment of contingency as the methodological solution to doing anthropology of the contemporary. This is not to deny the importance of staying attentive to contingency-Marx himself, after all, was a supremely careful theorist of the contingent. But contingency alone, I suggest, cannot adequately serve as explanation for the sorts of consistent historical unfoldings with which this volume is concerned.9
Both Jasanoff, with her idea of co-production, and Marx, with his histori-cal dialectic method for studying the unfolding of systems and logics of capital, are theorists who take the contingent seriously, but refuse it as the point at which (to use a Wittgensteinian phrase) explanations run out. This leads to methodological and conceptual dilemmas though: how might we think causally about the trajectory of capitalization of the life sciences? How might co-production, or Marxian analytics, or indeed other kinds of conceptual frameworks, help work through the problem with which I have introduced this volume-concerning a particular political economic and epistemological trajectory that, over space and time, indicates a process of capitalization, but where the norms and forms of capitalization are complicated, and where falling prey to economic determinism would be an impoverished analytic move?
As an example of the dilemma that I am trying to elucidate, let me consider Emily Martin's work on the dual movement of capital and life toward flexibility, Flexible Bodies (1995). Martin's analysis is not simply diagnostic; it forces us to ask a series of analytic questions. Why flexibility? Why at this time (the 1980s and 1990s)? Martin shows that flexibility is geared toward modalities of maximizing productivity, within certain, particular politicaleconomic conjunctures. Martin's account of "flexible bodies" most certainly shows a particular co-production of forms of life with forms of capital. But this co-production occurs under the sign of certain value systems that structure the terrain within which it happens. Melinda Cooper paints a similar canvas, showing a similar kind of dual structure, of co-production, but under the sign of particular political-economic and epistemological structures, in Life as Surplus (2008) . This is entirely an analysis of the co-production of life sciences with neoliberal economics, but at a moment in history (the 1970s onward) wherein the appropriation of both by capital is a consistent, and increasingly dominant, feature.
My interest in this volume, inspired by works such as those just cited, is to understand the co-production of life and capital along with the consistent unfolding whereby life is increasingly appropriated (or at least appropriable) by capital. How one provides such an understanding is a fundamental methodological question, and each chapter implicitly or explicitly deals with this question in its own way and on its own terms. I myself have three suggestions in this regard, all based on a fundamental provocation: that it is analytically important to not abandon the question of determination, but at the same time, it is important to think of determination as not always already implying pre-determination.
Rather, first, one can think about multiple determinations. Max Weber did so throughout his work. While he never abandoned the question of causality-in many ways, it was one of the central questions that structured his work and method-he recognized that causes for social phenomena were always multiple, and establishing that multiplicity had to be an empirical task. There were a number of empirical strategies that Weber adopted: historicist; comparativist; and, in his rendering, sociological, through the device of the ideal type.10 Second, one can think about overdetermination. Overdetermination is originally a term of Freudian psychoanalysis, further developed and analyzed by Louis Althusser to suggest a subjectively mediated contextual relationship, which, while not causal in any simple sense, might nonetheless appear to be disproportionately important (Althusser 1969 (Althusser [1965 ). And so, even if a particular set of political economic formations do not in any direct and simplistic way lead to particular epistemic emergences, they could still disproportionately set the stage within which the latter take shape in particular ways and, further, appear to do so to various actors in ways that naturalize complicated relationships into simple causal ones. Thus, even if capitalism represents particular types of political-economic formations, in this current moment in world history, as Slavoj Žižek argues, it "overdetermines all alternative formations, as well as non-economic strata of social life" (2004, 294) . Therefore, even while emphasizing the historicity and the far-from-natural emergence of capitalism as a set of political economic forms and structures, it is important to acknowledge the importance of capital as being what Žižek calls the "'concrete universal' of our historical epoch" (ibid.).
And third, one can think through Marx's phrase of the economy as being determining "in the last instance" (Marx 2009 (Marx [1858 ). I wish to reflect on this phrase at some length, as an opening into thinking about Marx's method and its relevance for studying the life sciences and capital. Marx's phrase is often understood to signify his economic determinism, but it can, in fact, be read in a far more open-ended fashion. Indeed, I would argue that a proper, conjunctural reading of Marx, which is attentive to the moment and context of his writing, must read the phrase in a more open-ended fashion, especially considering the fact that Marx, in attempting to develop a materialist basis for understanding the economic, social, and political orders of his time, was writing against idealists of various sorts (including Young Hegelians, utopian socialists, and certain bourgeois thinkers). Frederich Engels makes this point explicitly. Even without necessarily providing a clear alternative to thinking about the problem of determination, Engels clarifies that neither he nor Marx meant themselves to be read in terms that simply implied the predetermination of the social by the economic. One can, indeed, see in Engels a quite elaborate attentiveness to contingency, but it is contingency that is operational under the sign of certain kinds of formations.
According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure-political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas-also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible), the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. . . . Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasise the main principle vis-à-vis our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to give their due to the other elements involved in the interaction.11
What Engels is suggesting is that the economic is, to borrow a phrase from Bruno Latour, an obligatory point of passage-it is impossible to understand the social and the political in the conjuncture in which Marx was writing, of industrial capitalism, without accounting for it. But to say that something is necessary to understand is hardly the same as saying that it predetermines the sociopolitical.
Each of these three strategies for thinking about determination as not always already predetermination-owing themselves respectively to Weber, Freud, and Marx, three of the great social theorists of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth-deploys a different explanatory modality. The first is historical and anthropological (and, relatedly, what Weber calls "sociological"); the second is ideological and subjective; and the third is, for want of a better word, structural. But that "structure," in Marx's writings, is in fact extremely complicated, and Marx is supple in his analysis of it. It is not enough to say that the economic, in Marx, is necessary but not determining. It is also important to recognize that when Marx analyzes "the economic," he is analyzing multiple things.
One can see this quite clearly in volume 1 of Capital, which is perhaps Marx's most schematic rendering of the structure of capital (Marx 1976 (Marx [1867 ). The structural elements of capital-concerning the production of value in the relationship between the use and exchange of an object within a particular political-economic formation-are outlined at great length through most of the volume, which starts with an analysis of commodities, moves on to an analysis of money, looks at the way in which the continuous exchange of one for the other somehow leads to the generation of surplus in spite of it being an apparent exchange of equivalents, analyzes the crucial mediator (the labor of the worker) in this process, and concludes that in fact it is because this labor is always already labor power, containing within it an excess potential for work over and above that remunerated by wage, that one has the ability to generate surplus value. This much is schematic, abstract, and structural; and it is made "real," within the parameters of the schema, in the transition from analyzing absolute surplus value (which is the abstract rendering of surplus value in the hypothetical interaction between a capitalist and a worker) to relative surplus value (which is the real rendering of surplus value generated in the collective interactions between capitalists and workers, which are mediated, crucially, by machinery).
But even within this schematic rendering of the structure of capital, one sees the inescapable presence of both the ideological/subjective and the historical/anthropological. The ideological/subjective dimension is to be found in the crucial section on commodity fetishism, which speaks to the abstraction that is at the heart of an apparently thoroughly materialist analysis. It is, indeed, quite literally in the heart of the analysis, being placed carefully between the sections on commodities and on money, and at the cusp of the development of the analysis of surplus value. And it is about the commodity, on the face of it a simple material thing, being "full of metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties," and thereby appearing to individuals as a mediator of social bonds. Marx is careful to call this abstraction "fetishism" rather than "ideology," an indication of the vexed place of the concept of ideology in his writings.12 But even if commodity fetishism is not ideology, in the specific manner in which Marx develops that concept in his early writings such as The German Ideology (Marx and Engels 1963 [1845]), it is still ideological; that is, it refers to the masking of real social relations through appearance, illusion, and naturalization of those illusions. Žižek, indeed, suggests that the notion of commodity fetishism is central to Marx's analysis of capital, getting as it does not "to the secret of the content of the form, but to the secret of the form itself " (Žižek 1994, 296).
The historical/anthropological dimension is to be found at the end of volume 1, in the section on "The So-Called Primitive Accumulation." In this, Marx shows the historical conditions of possibility that even make possible the establishment of the structure that is elucidated until that point. This history is a violent one, involving the enforcement of property regimes (in England, through the dispossession of peasants from the land during the enclosure movement), followed by the forcible outlawing of vagrancy that pushed these dispossessed peasants into the factories as workers for industrial capitalism. On the one hand, this section is striking in its absolute empirical specificity-the reading of particular laws that were enacted over time in England, and the care with which Marx insists on that particularity (Marx 1976 (Marx [1867 , part 8). At the same time, in spite of this rigorous specificity, there is a more general structural provocation, pertaining to the constitutive relationship of violence to the history of capital, so that "capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt" (ibid. 926); a provocation that disputes the myth of "free" exchange of labor for wage that is propagated by bourgeois political economists, and that undergirds the entire preceding structural analysis.
In addition to these three dimensions-the structural, the ideological/ subjective, and the historical/anthropological-"the economic" in Marx has a fourth dimension, in its guise as political economy, which is relevant for the concerns of this volume: its epistemological dimension. In order to explore this, I must back up to reiterate what Marx is doing, especially in his later works. In Capital (and also in the rough notes that represent his work toward it, Grundrisse), Marx is engaged in a project of critique that is not criticism or denunciation, but rather, in a Hegelian sense, a mode of analysis that attempts to explore the limits of a concept or practice. What is the concept or practice that Marx is critiquing? In his development of the concept of surplus value, Marx is analyzing capitalist exchange. But what is capitalist exchange? Is it concept, is it practice, or is it system? This is crucial, because often in order to grasp the "stuff of the world," as Marx is attempting to do, one has to constantly shift registers between looking at concepts, at practice, at systems, at objects. And how to do that remains a live methodological challenge for contemporary analysis, as much as it was for Marx.
I would suggest that, in fact, Marx was not doing systemic analysis in any simple sense; he was not trying to understand "capitalism," because capitalism as a singular is an absurdity-it did not exist in Marx's time, nor has it since. Systems of capitalist exchange certainly have existed, but they have been always fluid and emergent, taking specific organizational, institutional, and political forms in particular times and places. What Marx was trying to do, rather, was understand capital.
But what is capital, in material terms? Money and commodities. Yet money and commodities by themselves do not constitute capital; they only do so when operational in a system that is structurally geared toward the generation of surplus. Here, one is potentially confronted with a tautology, of a system that only makes sense in terms of the modalities of functioning of the objects that constitute that system, objects that themselves only function as constituents of that system when already situated within those systemic logics. After all, money and the things that circulate in exchange relations with money both existed in precapitalist societies, and systems of monetary exchange existed for centuries before capitalism. What is that magical element that breaks this tautology and mediates the exchange of money and commodity to turn them into capital? It is labor.
Who came up with this answer? Not Marx-he was playing off of this fact, which was already well-known at the time of his writing. It was wellknown because political economy-an emergent but already powerful body of knowledge that explained how capital works-said so. Indeed, Marx's crucial modification to this understanding was in insisting that it was not labor-work that was materialized and remunerated adequately in wagebut labor power-the constitutive potential for labor over and above that remunerated in wage-that actually was the driving force of capital, by providing the conditions of possibility for surplus-value generation.
The analysis of labor power, crucially, comes not from an empirical observation of the accrual of value, but from the critique of political economy, from the fact that political economy's own analysis of capital failed to account for the fact that if labor was simply a mediator in a process of exchange and that if that labor was "free" and remunerated, then it was capital that kept growing, while labor was exploited and alienated. This is what political economy failed to explain; this is what political economy failed to explain. In other words, Marx's critique of capital was not a critique of capitalism, which would have been an absurdity; and it could not have been a critique of exchange per se, because there was no way of empirically accessing exchange per se except through the means available to know and understand that exchange.
In other words, Marx was-especially in his later writings-critiquing the way in which we came to understand capitalist exchange-and that way was through political economy, which was the foundational epistemology of the time that explained these mechanisms. Capital is, after all, subtitled "a critique of political economy"-not "a critique of capitalism," or even "a critique of capital." Political economy failed to take into account the history of capital, whose dynamics it claimed to explain; and it failed to be attentive to the abstractions with which capital was able to hide its "true" nature. Yet it functioned as authoritative knowledge.
With this elaborate exegesis on Marx's method, I wish to return to the problem of conceptualization and method that I started with. My entry point into thinking about Marx's method was to suggest that his statement that the economic is determining "in the last instance" is in fact not a determinist statement. But I have ended up by suggesting that not only is Marx not determinist, but he is also, methodologically, an epistemologist-just as he is, variously, a structuralist, a historian, an anthropologist, and a philosopher of abstraction and naturalization. Indeed, Marx cannot understand capital except through epistemology; but this not does mean, again, that political economy determines capitalism. What one sees, rather, is the development of an analytic that, in fact, looks rather uncannily like co-production! Marx is looking at systems and regimes of exchange and value that are made intelligible, and naturalized, through epistemology, which in turn responds to those forms of exchange and value in its own development as an authoritative form of knowledge. Value and epistemology, in this analytic, are coproduced. Yet, at the same time, Marx claims it is the economic that is determining in the last instance.
Methodologically, Marx suggests the importance of shifting registers, between the historical, anthropological, analytic, and epistemological. But when it comes specifically to the question of determination, Marx presents a challenge of method and conceptualization that is a dialectic between the co-production of value and epistemology, and the determination "in the last instance" by the economic, where "in the last instance" refers not to predetermination, but at the very least to multiple determinations and overdeterminations, and where "the economic" at least has structural, ideological/subjective, historical/anthropological, and epistemological dimensions.
The question of the mutual investment of the life sciences and capital, therefore, can open itself up to a number of different explanatory schema that are attentive to contingency without reifying the contingent as itself the ultimate form of explanation; and that is what this volume does in different ways. The specification of particular relations of co-production to particular types of consistent unfoldings is, in part, the project of this book. Each chapter develops this relationship, explicitly or implicitly, in its own way; but I would suggest that all the chapters, even the ones that do not claim to be Marxist, are caught within a problematic that is shaped by the Marxian inheritance of thinking of the relationships between the co-productions and mutual determinations of the life sciences and capital.
Investment is one of those wonderful dual-edged words that points simultaneously in different directions. On the one hand, it suggests monetary investment in and by the market, speaking to regimes of valuation that fall within regimes of calculability (if not determinate, then at least probabilistic). On the other hand, it speaks to an emotional commitment-questions of obligation, passion, ethics, morality, hope, love, and pain are all at play in various peoples' investments in the life sciences and in capital.
In one register, then, Lively Capital is about the commercialization of the life sciences-its institutional histories, epistemic formations, and systems of valuation. In a second register, however, it refers to the lively affects-the emotions and desires-at play when technologies and research impinge on experiences of embodiment, kinship, identity, disability, citizenship, accumulation, or dispossession. In this volume, the topic of capital is specifically allowed interpretive range. The intention is not to discuss the "effects" of a particular new technological development, or the adequate ethical response to such new developments; it is, instead, to see if a potentially fresh set of approaches to looking at the life sciences and biotechnologies and their relationships to the social, to "life" as lived experience, can be facilitated.
Life sciences and Capital as objects of inquiry
Three points about the objects of inquiry that this volume addresses need to be emphasized. The first is that Lively Capital, in its broadest conception, is about a set of interactions between science and society wherein "science" and "society" cannot be analytically purified from one another or assumed as given. The chapters in this volume examine neither the "social impacts" of science nor the impacts of society on scientific progress. Rather, as has been the method of recent work in science and technology studies (StS), both the scientific and the social are up for grabs here-none of the authors assume or believe positivist narratives that portray either the technoscience they study, or the culture, politics, or ethics within which that technoscience is completely situated, as a stable or linear process. Second, technoscience goes beyond the boundaries of the laboratory, even though the laboratory is an essential site for technoscientific production. Technoscience is equally produced in the deliberations and actions of policymakers (state and nonstate), market actors, activists (whether opposed to technoscience or fighting for its acceleration or intensification), consumers of various sorts, editors of scientific journals, and patients. One of the methodological challenges of studying lively capital is that it is not self-evident where one should look, for technoscience is always already many things-a collection of institutions, normative structures, practices, ideologies, and vocations. And third, we are not just concerned with the actions and effects of humans here. Indeed, both the actors of technoscience and the constituent elements of capital transcend human agency. Information, commodities, money, filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, dogs, air, rice, genes, websites, and search engines, all make their appearance as central actors in the same way that scientists, policymakers, venture capitalists, bioethicists, and anthropologists do.
What, then, is lively capital as an object of study? Rather than strictly define the life sciences or capital at the outset, this volume is focused around topics that speak to their confluence, such as the promissory grammars that surround the search for therapies, the circuits of circulation of pharmaceuticals or other biologicals, questions concerning the increased recourse to information sciences in fields such as genetics or environmentalism, and the various legal techniques and political strategies deployed in order to moderate debate and construct authoritative governance regimes. Nonetheless, it is important to justify why the life sciences and capital are so central to this volume, and what is so lively about either or about their confluence.
In an attempt to theorize the contemporary, we encounter the persistence and intensification of the life sciences as one of the foundational epistemologies of our times, rather in the manner in which Michel Foucault diagnosed biology, political economy, and philology to be the foundational epistemologies upon which modernity was built in Enlightenment Europe. There have indeed been profound shifts in the understanding of "life" over the past half century. The life sciences are a shifting referent, and the biology of today often bears little apparent relation to the biology of the nineteenth century.
Simultaneously, we can see shifts in the locations of knowledge production in the life sciences, such that research is increasingly performed in corporate locales, with corporate agendas and practices. This is a corporatization, as mentioned earlier, that has been particularly marked since the 1980s and that intensified through the 1990s and the early part of the new millennium. An immediate challenge faced by work such as that contained in this volume is to trace the contours of this institutional shift, all the while situating it in the context of the epistemic and technological changes happening within the science, especially the trend in the last half century toward understanding biology at the cellular and molecular level, rather than at the level of the organism.13 This move toward the molecular is related to the increased ease with which life gets conceived and represented in informational terms. Both commodities, such as therapeutic molecules, and "basic" scientific knowledge, which can itself be more and more easily represented as information, and packaged and commodified as, for instance, databases or diagnostic kits, are being created in this increasingly corporate environment. If StS has always been concerned with the construction of scientific facts, then what does a scientific fact mean, and how does it operate as a fact in the world, when that world is increasingly that of the market? How are these facts constituted differently in the market environment than the way in which they were constituted in a "traditional" scientific ethos, and how are objects and subjects in the world constituted in turn by these facts?14 What is the relationship of the scientific representations performed by these facts to political representation? And how can we situate these changes in the technoscience and in the institutional contexts of their conduct comparatively, in different parts of the world?
At stake in this co-production of new forms of knowledge about life with new sites of such knowledge production are ways to intervene in and adjudicate on matters of health, life, and death, such as for instance through resultant emergent practices of medicine or nutritional supplementation of food crops. Therefore, the changes that this volume seeks to trace concern the changing nature and relevance of the biopolitical, referring to Foucault's diagnosis that one of the markers of modernity is the way in which its institutions and discourses seek to put life at the explicit center of political calculation (Foucault 1990 (Foucault [1978 ). Biopolitics plays out or gets transformed through questions of rights and ethics, such as privacy, informed consent, ownership, and the fluid and contested boundaries that separate the public domain from legitimate private property, and is, at least in part, economic. The question of the economies, mechanisms, and multiple deter-minations and overdeterminations of the co-production mentioned above, where "economy" refers not just to the quantitative measures of productivity or profit, but also to the regimes of value, both material and symbolic, that form the theater of political articulation, is in many ways the central one for Lively Capital.
Value is a central concept for this collection, and links questions of political economy to those of ethics and governance. It is a double-jointed word that implies not just material valuation by the market, but also a concern with meanings and practices of ethics. This is particularly salient for industries such as biotech and pharmaceuticals, which generate significant symbolic capital from being, as they are never averse to pointing out, in the business of saving lives. Systems of valuation are animated by abstractions that go beyond quantitative material indicators, and the ethical is often a shorthand that black-boxes these abstractions. Among the tasks of this collection is to open the black box-to posit ethics not as independent of political economy, but rather to see how the two are articulated, ethics being an integral part of the political economies of the life sciences and biotechnologies. Equally, ethics contains its own political economies and capacities for being institutionalized and made corporate. Therefore, parallel to emergent regimes of technoscience and capital are emergent regimes of ethics, with increasingly powerful voices in constructing discursive, normative, and ideological terrains. The analyses of these cannot be compartmentalized or kept easily separate from one another, which is why a number of the concepts concerning value in this collection are those like promise, hope, hype, obligation, and love-none of these evidently political-economic terms, yet, as they operate through this volume, absolutely central to the analysis of the liveliness of capital, of the life sciences and capital, of Lively Capital. Value also operates at multiple scales, from the local to the global, and the historical and geographic contexts from which the papers speak are essential to resist a positivist rendering of value, whether market value or ethical or symbolic value, as somehow unitary and universal. This volume, then, asks how and in what ways it becomes possible to think about ethics and politics in technocapital, and in our emergent worlds.
intellectual trajectories
I wish here to suggest four intellectual trajectories that operate at different scales in the work represented here, without making any claims to providing a review of the range of work done on the life sciences and society.15 The first two are the trajectories of science and technology studies (StS) and social and cultural anthropology as separate fields; the third is their convergence; and the fourth is the impact on social theory, more broadly construed, as informed by the first three trajectories.
On the face of it, Lively Capital is conceived as an interdisciplinary venture that goes beyond the two disciplinary trajectories of StS and anthropology, and the volume brings together contributors housed in disciplines and areas of inquiry as broad and varied as African studies, anthropology, comparative literature, history of consciousness, public policy, rhetoric, StS, and sociology. A number of these fields of inquiry are themselves recently constituted and continuously emergent interdisciplines. And yet, the primary concern of the chapters in this volume lies in tracing particularly rapid contemporary emergence. This brings with it a set of methodological and conceptual challenges, which speak most directly to the current disciplinary concerns of anthropology perhaps more than any other. Without wishing to claim a particular disciplinary imprint for this collection, I think it is fair to say that the conjuncture in the humanities and social sciences that sets the stage for a volume such as this is an emergent and still fluid conversation between the amorphous methods of StS and the more entrenched (in institutional terms) discipline of cultural and social anthropology. This has resulted, on the one hand, in an increased turn toward ethnographic method by sociologists of science and technology, who in many ways dominated StS in the 1980s, and, on the other hand, in a serious pedagogical and theoretical engagement with StS literature that has arisen from outside the canon of disciplinary anthropology by anthropologists.
It should be noted that StS, while a small field, itself has multiple genealogies. The foundational ones, in many ways, grew out of the Edinburgh school of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and its subsequent development in France through actor-network theory (ANt).16 But there were also other genealogies of StS represented within the United States-such as at mIt, where I received my doctorate-that grew out of other intellectual trajectories. In the case of mIt's StS program, such trajectories included, crucially, both the history of technology and the American political context of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which had seen science and technology reconstituted as intensely political sites of civic engagement.17 Feminism provided another crucial genealogy and introduced hitherto ignored dimensions to the study of technoscience, such as by looking at the gendered and racial nature of its discourse and practice, or by generating more embodied, experiential accounts of technoscientific development, or simply by writing about science and technology to an audience committed to feminist praxis.18 By the late 1980s, anthropology was also getting explicitly interested in science and technology as an object of ethnographic study, a seminal marker of which was Sharon Traweek's ethnography of high-energy physicists, Beamtimes and Lifetimes (1988). 19 A crucial marker of a certain anthropological turn that subsequently opened the discipline up to something like StS was the "writing culture" moment of the mid-1980s. The publication of Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986) and Anthropology as Cultural Critique (Marcus and Fischer 1986) made tangible an "experimental moment" in the human sciences, and in anthropology in particular, which had been brewing for the previous two decades of the discipline's encounter with political economy, psychoanalysis, and poststructuralism. The books represented, simultaneously, a certain (particular) coming to fruition of a Geertzian interpretive anthropology and a promissory note for a modality of work yet-to-come. Calls for multisited ethnography that developed over the subsequent decade (for instance, Marcus 1995a) were elaborated out of this mid-1980s moment and represented one programmatic idea for the development of ethnographic research projects that were adequate to the contemporary intellectual and political moment of globalizing (post)modernity.
The ambition here concerned an at the time unstated recognition of the fact that ethnography had, in Douglas Holmes's and George Marcus's formulation (2005), to be "refunctioned" in a fundamental way given the changing objects of ethnographic inquiry. Writing Culture itself did not have the words to articulate this refunctioning, which it was already calling for, though scholarship in the subsequent two decades has argued for it in different ways.20 It is in the context of the decentering and refunctioning of ethnography that StS comes to matter, because, regardless of whether the dialogue with anthropology is explicit or not, recent ethnographies of science and technology have contributed to methodological debates within anthropology.
What one sees, therefore, is the development of an amorphous and interesting conversation between anthropology and StS over the past two decades, though the trajectories and investments of that conversation are not uniform. This has happened at a moment when StS has turned to ethnography as a crucial modality through which to describe technoscience, supplementing and in some cases supplanting earlier foci that drew on sociology or history of science and technology. And at a parallel moment when anthropology has started engaging with a great variety of objects and processes as ethnographic objects and sites of study, especially engaging with globally dispersed, rapidly emergent processes that are centrally involved in the constitution of the modern world, technoscience being exemplary in this regard. It is this intellectual context-of anthropology turning to technoscience as an object of study, over the same period of time that StS turns to ethnography as a method with which to study its objects-that this volume is situated within.
I wish to suggest that the confluence of StS and anthropology is not simply a traversal of interests across distinct disciplinary spaces. StS indeed never really was a disciplinary space with clearly constituted boundaries, except in certain departments. Anthropology has been such a disciplinary space, with all the credibility, gravitas, and constraint that comes with disciplinary projects; but it has been marked by practices of inquiry that have constantly exceeded the boundaries of its own disciplinary regulation. In this sense, both StS and anthropology have been marked by an excess or surplus, which is the "stuff of the world" that has bled into their practices of inquiry to torque them. The coming together of anthropology and StS represents the coming together of two fields of inquiry that have always found it difficult to contain themselves. However, in this process, neither remains unchanged. Anthropology plus StS is not merely technoscience meets culture. Rather, it is the beginning of a profoundly interdisciplinary conversation, the likes of which can be seen in a volume such as this.
I illustrate what I mean by "interdisciplinary" by turning to the object of study here, the life sciences, which have been particularly open to being shaped by multiple disciplinary influences. When the life sciences turned "genomic," the importance of elucidating life processes in informational terms became evident. This has, indeed, been evident for at least half a century, as cybernetic understandings of life-as-code became normative in molecular biology in the 1950s and 1960s.21 What genomics has allowed in the last decade or so is a radical change in information-generating capacity, so that the epistemic dilemma of having too little information to decode life processes at the cellular and molecular level became, almost overnight, a dilemma of having too much information to make sense of. Challenges of data generation very quickly became challenges of data mining and data management.22 What this meant was that computational capability and informatics became central to the everyday operation of genomics research, and suddenly biologists who had not been trained in computer science had to start talking to computer scientists who often had little domain knowledge of biology. Interdisciplinary work in such a situation was not a choice-it was necessary in order to successfully keep pace with the very possibilities opened up by the experimental systems that were being studied. What changed was not just the approach to doing things, but rather the very nature of the problem; no longer was the question "How do we generate enough information to create meaning?," but rather "How do we sift through the information we have to create meaning?" Even the meaning of data came to be at stake through these interdisciplinary encounters.
For me, this has deep parallels to the challenges confronting ethnographic projects that are theoretical in scope and ambition. The problem of theory today is not simply to "make sense" of things we see as empirical observers of the world through frameworks that are already given. It is, instead, to make sense of a problem when the very nature of the problem is at stake.23 I wish to suggest therefore that the theoretical problem of this volume is not to come up with the "theory of " life or capital or governance or globalization or markets or neoliberalism, but is rather to come up with forms of inquiry that are adequate to studying a contemporary conjuncture of the life sciences and capital that contributors to the volume believe is of worldhistorical significance. My own investment in Marx, for instance, has nothing to do with whether he was "right" or "wrong" in a predictive sense, but has everything to do with the fact that he developed a mode of inquiry that allowed an investigation into capital in ways that political economy, because of the ways in which it had framed the problem in advance, was unable to do. Similarly, the theoretical work of this volume is to think through the modes of inquiry that might be adequate to studying the life sciences in all its historically, socially, and politically situated manifestations, at a moment when, in Michael Fischer's formulation, "life is outrunning the pedagogies in which we were trained" (Fischer 2003, 37).
Broadly speaking, there are four distinct nodes of emphasis in this volume. First, the most Marxian chapters focus directly on theorizing capital, occasionally (though not consistently) through a close reading of Marx. Second are chapters that consider questions of property, primarily through a study of intellectual-property issues in the life sciences and the ways in which these controversies have redrawn boundaries of the public and private. Third are chapters concerned most directly with questioning the spatiality of biocapital and engaging the question of what "the global" means. And fourth are chapters that are concerned most directly with the affective dimensions of lively capital-the "surplus" constituted by obligation, desire, and love, which cannot be captured by quantifiable political economic mea-sures. Elements of all of these emphases-concerning capital, the global, property, and affect-are to be found in varying degrees in a number of the contributions.
overview of Contributions
This volume is divided into four parts. Part I, "Encountering Value," engages biocapital through different readings of value, showing how these forms of value are always already relational and implicated in the creation of certain types of subjects. Part II, "Property and Dispossession," focuses on the constitutive place of property in the establishment of various forms of biocapital, as well as the expropriation that forms the conditions of possibility for these property regimes to be instantiated in the first place. Part III, "Global Knowledge Formations," focuses on the epistemic and institutional rationalities within which the life sciences can be understood at transnational and global scales. And Part IV, "Promissory Experiments and Emergent Forms of Life," focuses on the affective and ethical dimensions of hype and hope that are constitutive to emergent and experimental forms of biocapital.
Part 1 begins with Joseph Dumit's experimental reading of volume 1 of Marx's Capital, "Prescription Maximization and the Accumulation of Surplus Health in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The_BioMarx_Experiment." Dumit attempts to understand logics of contemporary pharmaceutical capital through Marx's Capital, in the process of which he discovers that the latter's analysis holds up surprisingly well in describing the risk logics that the former operates through (Marx 1976 (Marx [1867 ). The key issue for Dumit is understanding surplus in pharmaceutical logic, given the fact that for Marx it is surplus value that constitutes the moment of exploitation of the worker. Dumit comes up with the notion of "surplus health," which is his analogous concept to surplus labor. He defines surplus health as "the capacity to add medications to our life through lowering the level of risk required to be 'at risk,'" a lowering that occurs through the setting of biomedical risk thresholds.
Dumit is tracing a particular logic, a logic that acquires its power through the fact that it speaks in a series of potentialities-the potential for future illness, the potential for future market growth, the potential for greater therapeutic consumption among ever larger segments of the world population. Like Jeremy Bentham's panopticon (Foucault 1977) , this logic does not have to be realized in an actual visible structure for it to create its effects and af-fects. The risk threshold is the key to the operation of this potentiality; it is that which is set by biomedicine in order that its logic might unfold, in a manner analogous to the way in which the setting of wage by capital is the moment at which the conditions of possibility for the creation of surplus labor are set up and calibrated. In this logic, market size does not matter as much as market potential does, because the former is simply a retroactive indicator of events already gone by and therefore not a true indicator of value, which is always future oriented; just as in industrial capital, the realization of value occurs not through profit (the actual, quantifiable amount of money made over that expended), but through surplus labor (the potential for labor productivity in excess of that remunerated by wage). The logic of capital here is therefore thoroughly speculative.
The other chapters in part I locate Dumit's analysis of pharmaceutical logics of value generation next to other forms of value, thereby showing how even the surplus value that Dumit traces in rigorously Marxian fashion is animated in various ways by what Donna Haraway calls "encounter value." Haraway's "Value-Added Dogs and Lively Capital" argues that Marxian categories of use and exchange value are relationally constituted and therefore mediated by encounters. In other words, the fundamental categories of Marx's labor theory of value are subjective.24 She develops this argument through an account of dog-human interactions wherein dog worlds are increasingly technocorporate.
Haraway focuses on dogs in part because of the constitutive history of canine labor power in the story of capital, a history that is not a part of the dominant narrative of capital as it gets told. But the insertion of dogs into systems of capital is not just as labor, but is rather threefold: in contemporary U.S. culture, dogs are also, themselves, commodities, as well as consumers of commodities. In an uncanny link to Dumit's chapter, Haraway points out that the size of the pet-food market in the United States in 2003 was equal to the size of the statin market that year.
The larger conceptual argument about exchange that Haraway is making here is one that has been made by a number of feminist science-studies scholars, which is that questions of exchange are always underwritten by those of kinship.25 Kinship, in this context, operates at two levels. The first is at the level of the human-animal familial bond, while the second is in the importance of tracing canine pedigrees. Haraway points to the "humananimal companionate family" as a diagnostic marker of contemporary U.S. capitalism, which sees a "productive embrace of kin and brand." And so, statistical issues such as the size of the pet-food market have to be considered in relation to affective issues in particular biopolitical situations involving dogs' health and illness, their life and death, where these situations often manifest as a consequence of the dogs' subject-position as a kin member in human households. For instance, Haraway's question "How does a companion animal's human make judgments about the right time to let her dog die?" speaks, on the one hand, to the increased salience of such questions when biomedical technologies of intervention allow canine lives to be prolonged through the diagnosis and treatment of illness in ways not possible before. But it also feels like a resoundingly familiar question to those concerned with the human impacts of new biomedical technologies, a question that (at the time of its writing, in November 2004) provided an uncanny anticipation of such debates that took political center-stage in the United States, through 2005, in media spectacles such as that surrounding the death of Terri Schiavo.
Timothy Choy's chapter, "Air's Substantiations," shows how the air in Hong Kong is simultaneously felt experience, pollution, literary imagery, and the substance of transnational capital negotiations. Choy therefore locates how the environment simultaneously becomes a health problem and an economic one. Air matters, and this mattering refers both to the materiality of air and to the fact that it is an object of concern, care, and investment among those who are affected by it. Choy's attempt in his piece is to layer the various ways in which it matters. He is concerned with "four forms of air . . . (1) air as medical fact, (2) air as bodily engagement, (3) air as a constellation of difference, and (4) air as an index for international comparison."
This superimposition of different forms of air points to the "warp and woof of the network being woven." These are global networks of fact, capital, affect, and lived experience. The manner in which Choy investigates air-as simultaneously material and abstract, as object and signifier, as circulating matter and as an object that we enter into constitutive lively relationships with, and as something that, while often taken for granted, functions at multiple registers simultaneously-shows an uncanny resemblance to the way in which Marx considers money, in Grundrisse, as, simultaneously, means of exchange, measure of exchange, universal equivalent, and as world money (Marx 1993 (Marx [1857 ).
These interweaving registers produce Hong Kong as at once a global and a local site. They are saturated with the particularities of Hong Kong's historical and cultural specificity, but are also entirely dependent on locating Hong Kong's air as part of the global environmental problem that transcends boundaries and place. Choy therefore talks about air in Hong Kong in terms of what he calls a "poetics of place," where "place" does not signify locality as much as it signifies the particularities that are located within, and in turn both shape and defy, larger structures.
Property is the central analytic that structures part II of this volume. The chapters by Sheila Jasanoff and Elta Smith focus on intellectual-propertyrights issues in biotechnology. Jasanoff 's chapter, "Taking Life: Private Rights in Public Nature," looks at the way in which the law constructs the boundaries between public and private by considering landed property (through a reading of the U.S. law of takings) against intellectual-property (Ip) debates surrounding new biotechnologies. The takings clause considers the contexts in which the state can appropriate land for "public" purposes. Jasanoff argues that what constitutes a public purpose in fact involves a calculus of a range of material against nonmaterial values, where the material values often pertain to property, and the nonmaterial ones concern abstract concerns of "public good" that by definition are hard to quantify. In this calculus, property rights often function as the limit to taking land for public use.
Intellectual property is a set of rights given to inventors, thereby signifying "invention," which is man-made, and has to be distinguished from a "discovery," which involves finding something that is deemed to occur naturally. The process of granting Ip rights involves, as Jasanoff puts it, "a removal of the thing being patented from nature to culture." A major way in which nature is converted to culture by law is to convert nature into property, which can subsequently be rendered liquid and made to circulate. The diagnosis of these bounded categories-"invention" and "discovery," which map onto the boundary between "nature" and "culture," where what is at stake is "public" and "private"-as typical of modernity is central to Bruno Latour's analysis in We Have Never Been Modern (1993). Rather than leave it at diagnosis, however, Jasanoff empirically investigates the steps that need to be taken in order to shift an object through a particular legal materialization from a "natural" to a "cultural" domain.
A crucial incongruence, however, is set up between the form of law and its content. There is a fundamental formal aspect to the functioning of Ip law in advanced liberal societies, one which sees it functioning consistently in certain ways to demarcate nature from culture, public from private. And yet, legal outcomes that follow the same logic of the law could vary radically, as seen in the different outcomes on the Harvard OncoMouse patent (which was held to be valid in the United States and subsequently in most advanced liberal countries, but denied by the Canadian Supreme Court).26
Understanding these different interpretations of patent law in the OncoMouse case, according to Jasanoff, involves understanding both the different conceptions of life and liveliness that are stake in the two situations, and the different imaginations of the public good that are at play-different abstractions that animate particular legal materializations. Elta Smith's chapter, "Rice Genomes: Making Hybrid Properties," relates property to health via nutrition through a study of rice-research endeavors. The discourse of rice genomics is one of food security for the Third World as well as one of commercial value. Indeed, Smith shows that much of the primary value of rice as an object of genomic research comes from the fact that it serves as such a good model organism for more profitable food crops like maize, wheat, and soy. Hence, nutrition or food security is increasingly articulated through and constrained by commercial viability or profitability. In addition to this institutional movement is a movement within rice research toward an emphasis on genomics, where information becomes a key material object whose access and ownership becomes essential to regulate. The corporatization of biology occurs simultaneously to biology becoming more of an information science. The multiple material forms of rice-"as scientific (genetic and genomic) information, as a model cereal, as a major food staple, as a cultural icon"-are as crucial to trace as the multiple institutional forms that emerge to conduct research on rice.
Smith writes about four different rice-genome projects, of which two were publicly funded and two privately funded. She shows that in fact it is difficult to demarcate what constitutes private property from what constitutes the public domain in each of the disclosure arrangements that surround these efforts. Rather, a spectrum of property forms emerge, none of which are purely "public" or "private," but are a hybrid of the two.
As the environment of rice research becomes increasingly corporate, research priorities shift toward where the markets are. Rice, being primarily a Third World staple crop, is not particularly attractive in this regard. But this profit-making imperative is in tension with a philanthropic imperative that has become increasingly articulated out of corporate environments. Thus, while rice is an object of corporate research interest because of its value as a model organism, the corporate discourse surrounding rice research is one that constantly emphasizes the social responsibility that is being fulfilled by research that is geared toward meeting Third World nutritional needs. However, Smith shows that the public beneficiary of "public" research is never clearly articulated. None of the intellectual-property debates around rice research even touch on questions of the commodity status of new or better rice strains, questions of seed availability, or distribution mechanisms, all of which are essential to food security.
Jasanoff 's and Smith's chapters look at the workings of intellectual property, in law and in practice. In the process, fundamental ontological questions-concerning nature, culture, value, the boundaries between commodities and objects in nature, or between the public domain and private property-all come to be at stake. The next two chapters, by Travis Tanner and Kristin Peterson, locate these ontological questions in terms of historical conditions of possibility; specifically, in relation to the forms of dispossession that the authors argue are necessary in order for regimes of contemporary biocapital to function. This section, therefore, sets up questions of property, which are themselves unsettled and in formation, in relation to forms of dispossession that provide the grounds upon which, as Marx also argued, capital emerges and functions.
Tanner's chapter, "Marx in New Zealand," is concerned with accumulation in the context of the genetic dispossession of indigenous peoples through projects such as the Human Genome Diversity Project (hgDp). He argues that such dispossession is not merely material (as in the extraction of human genetic material and its subsequent commodification through intellectual-property protection), but also cultural. The hgDp itself was a failed project, but similar practices of genetic archiving continue under new guises, and indigenous populations are often subject to them. These archiving practices, Tanner suggests, are not just about the production of value (whether scientific or commercial), but also of meaning. Such projects lead to the creation and reinscription of certain grand narratives-of capital and of modernity-that indigenous populations are subsumed into through their dispossession. What gets dispossessed, in part, is the possibility of alternative narratives to the grand genomic narrative, which is always already inscribed within a grand narrative of capital.
The question of narrative is crucial for Tanner. Hence, he approaches his argument not through an ethnographic study of technoscience, but rather through the reading of native literature. He focuses on Patricia Grace's novel Baby No-Eyes (1998), which is about Maori genetic dispossession based on a case of genetic theft that occurred in Wellington Public Hospital in 1991. This novel, and hence Tanner's argument, situates the question of biomedical ethics in the context of a larger and ongoing history, the struggle for land rights by indigenous people in New Zealand. Questions of genomic ethics, in Tanner's argument, cannot be divorced from this larger historical contextualization concerning landed property; but they also cannot be divorced from questions of narrative representation about indigenous peoples' stories. Tanner attempts to address these questions of narrative representation alongside those of legal and political representation.
The narratives of past and future get weaved together in the context of native populations as targets of genomic sampling experiments in that these experiments-seen by native populations as dispossession of something that is theirs and that is sacred-mirror the earlier dispossessions of land that were essential, in the first place, in making native populations fragile, on the verge of "extinction," and worthy of this kind of sampling effort. Therefore, Tanner's chapter has deep concerns with notions of property and ownership-are genes something that "belong" to their bearer, or can they become the intellectual property of scientists experimenting on them? Kristin Peterson's chapter, "AIDS Policies for Markets and Warriors: Dispossession, Capital, and Pharmaceuticals in Nigeria," argues that Africa is a site that gets "emptied out," extracted of its resources, and understanding this active dispossession is essential to understanding the nature of contemporary capital flows into Africa. Peterson's chapter concerns the nature of capital flows, but equally of Africa's relationship to globalization. Her insistence is that Africa is not simply a marginal entity that is outside the global, or "left behind." Rather, it is constantly articulated into the global through trade, aid, development, and economic policy. In Peterson's rendering, an analysis of capital that focuses on wealth accumulation (whether through speculation or manufacturing) is not enough, because that accumulation is always undergirded by other logics-of wealth extraction and dispossession-that are simultaneously at play. Further, Peterson shows that accumulation by dispossession is not something that comes before "real" capitalism, but is an ongoing process that is a necessary condition of possibility for global capital to function.27 This chapter provides an interesting contrast to Dumit's analysis, for what is at stake here is access to drugs, rather than an excess of them. And yet, access becomes a problem for Africa at the same time that excess becomes a problem in the United States through very similar neoliberal logics.
Access itself becomes a problem not just because of a constitutive lack of capacity, as is often portrayed, but because of specific, historical moments of dispossession that emptied out capacity. The implementation of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Imf) mandated Structural Adjustment Programs (SAps) in 1986 is a crucial moment in this regard. Peterson argues that SAps eviscerated Nigeria's pharmacy industry, thereby destroying its drug-distribution infrastructure. This means that even when drugs now flow into Nigeria through global aid schemes, there are no adequate mechanisms for their distribution. The military must therefore be deployed to distribute drugs, hence articulating pharmaceutical economies with military ones.
Part III begins with Andrew Lakoff 's piece, "Diagnostic Liquidity: Mental Illness and the Global Trade in DNA," which elaborates the theme of global trade. Lakoff traces the French biotechnology company Genset's attempts to look for genes for psychiatric illness in Argentine mental patients, showing the ways in which both institutional arrangements and epistemologies are at stake in such efforts. The key here is establishing the "potential universality of genomic knowledge about mental health," speaking to the key themes of potentiality and universality that emerge in other chapters in the volume. Establishing such universality would "render liquid" the mental illness experienced by Argentine patients as "globally" valid scientific information that can travel as a potential commodity. In the process, Lakoff shows that the very question of what constitutes a psychiatric illness is at stake.
The key issue of universality or particularity however is also an epistemic question, which, as Lakoff puts it, is one of "how to know . . . whether a case of bipolar disorder in the United States [is] the same 'thing' as a case of bipolar disorder in Argentina." These questions become constitutively ingrained in the problem of making the Argentine DNA liquid. This problem of epistemology is, further, not just a scientific experimental problem of how to identify or classify bipolar disorder: it is also linked to comparative questions of the nature of medical practice in Argentina as compared to Europe or North America, with the clinical diagnosis of bipolar disorder as such being much less common in the Argentine context. Therefore, while protocols for DNA sample collection or ethical regimes for informed consent could be quite easily standardized in the Argentine context, ventures such as Genset's also require a prior standardization of medical information, a much more difficult goal to achieve in practice.
A further complication arises from the fact that, as Lakoff shows, "bipolar disorder" is itself a biomedical category that has evolved along with the rise of a pharmaceutical-centered approach to psychiatric treatment. The purported universality of patients with bipolar disorder, therefore, hits up against the particularity of "bipolar disorder" as a disease category in the first place. And this particularity is highlighted by the Lacanian psychoanalysts who treat mentally ill patients in a ward adjacent to that in which, in the same hospital, the medical geneticists are collecting DNA samples from Genset. Complicating the epistemic difficulties faced by the medical geneti-cists in the story is the inherent subjectivity of psychoanalysis, which also makes scientific claims, but in opposition to the objectivity and classificatory impulses that lie at the heart of the epistemology of molecular genetics.
Wen-Hua Kuo investigates imperatives of standardization in his chapter, "Transforming States in the Era of Global Pharmaceuticals: Visioning Clinical Research in Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore." Through a comparative study of Japan's, Taiwan's, and Singapore's responses to imported drug products, Kuo looks at the moves toward regulatory standardization that occur when clinical trials become global and travel to Asia. This analysis sees the articulation of concerns with trade, with health, and with race.
Kuo's empirical material is drawn from the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (Ich). The primary attempt here is to "create a universal standard for drugs by neglecting as much as possible bodily differences," wherein "one will finally fit all." This is a logic that is deeply at odds with the personalizing logics of pharmaceutical marketing that Dumit describes, pointing to capital's contradictory impulses to universalize target populations (a move that consolidates potential markets instead of segmenting them) while individuating the subjects of therapeutic intervention (an individuation that is at the heart of neoliberal logics of self-governance).
Japan's particularity was its insistence that clinical trials be reproduced on Japanese populations in order for the results to be deemed applicable for drug marketing in Japan. Underlying this insistence was an assumption of fundamental racial or ethnic difference. In contrast to Japan, Kuo shows, Taiwan embraced Ich guidelines. This was a strategic assertion of national identity that showed Taiwan's ability to set regulatory guidelines for itself independent of the People's Republic of China. Meanwhile, Singapore's incentive for embracing harmonization is economic, with the burgeoning local biotech industry likely to be a beneficiary.
Kuo shows that each of these national responses attempts to authorize itself through science. Therefore, Japanese scientists are shown to embark on research that points to stratification and population uniqueness, such as population genomics. At the same time, Taiwanese researchers adopt, emphasize, and deploy other types of statistical data in order to justify their inclusion in Ich regimes. Singapore's case is tricky because of its highly multiethnic population, and so the state and researchers "just ignore racial difference" altogether. A comparison of these scientific strategies highlights the arbitrariness with which race or population or biology get accounted for or discounted in biomedical regimes. Yet it is precisely such arbitrary moves that set the conditions of possibility for subsequent "scientific" experimentation and the authority that stems from such science.
Environmentalism and scale-making are the subjects of analysis in Kim Fortun's chapter, "Biopolitics and the Informating of Environmentalism." Fortun looks at how informatics mediates political transitions at a number of scales. She does so by looking at how environmental informatics takes shape at a number of sites, such as environmental websites like scorecard. org; the deployment of environmental "worst-case scenarios" in politics and policymaking; or the ways in which informatics capacity leads to the elucidation of environmental factors involved in increased risk of asthma. In all of these sites, environmental informatics becomes a site of biopolitics. In Fortun's words, information technologies become "drivers of change at multiple scales." In this sense, "informationalism" becomes the analog to the industrialism that was at the heart of Marx's analysis of nineteenth-century capital.
The scalar dimension is key here, and is what distinguishes Fortun's analysis from linear-progress narratives of the glories of innovation. Indeed, Fortun is precisely not interested in informatics as simply a site of innovation, but rather in the ways in which it becomes one of "cultural production and ethical action." But the production of informatics deserves as much ethnographic attention as its productivity. This is because there are multiple investments in informatics, by radically different institutional actors (chemical companies as well as environmental activists, for instance), where these investments are simultaneously material, ethical, and affective. The production of informatics is "experimental," in that it is a scientific activity that is constantly being worked through and figured out, where the outcomes are not known in advance or calibrated against a readily testable hypothesis. But the production of knowledge through informatics is not just determined by the scientific experimentation that goes into the creation of websites or risk scenarios; it is also crucially dependent on how such information can be made public.
Fortun, therefore, maps a relationship between environmental-risk information and the public domain that is intensely political and that is, as much as anywhere else, shaped through policy initiatives and their interactions with corporate interests and grassroots mobilization. Unlike Smith, who shows the way in which informatics and public-domain issues get politically contested around the question of property, Fortun is concerned with the way in which security becomes the locus of this contestation.28 Informatics becomes the medium through which uncertainty (in this case, environmental risk) becomes engaged. Unlike in Dumit's case of pharmaceutical marketing, however, this engagement is not yet overdetermined or controlled by corporate interests. Instead, Fortun argues that informatics leads to the creation of "discursive gaps" within environmentalism that provide the potential for various sorts of political action, including possibly revolutionary ones. While the setting of clinical risk thresholds is an act of scientific expertise in which the experts are exclusively those sanctioned by the state or by corporations, the articulation of environmental risk is an expert discourse where "expertise" is constituted in a more polymorphic and potentially democratic fashion.
Part IV begins with Michael Fortun's chapter, "Genomics Scandals and Other Volatilities of Promising." Fortun concerns himself with the temporality that is ingrained within promising, which is the temporality of "a future still to come" (in opposition to a teleological future, a future that will be).29 The empirical material that he draws on is the story of the controversial Iceland-based genome company DeCode Genetics, which is archetypical of speculative capital.
Fortun traces the grammar of hype. The hype of genomic corporate discourse is deeply entangled with the epistemology of genomics, which also, constitutively, concerns itself with statements about the future. The promise in terms of scientific potential that genomics carries is inseparable from the promises that genome companies make about their potential as value generators in capital markets. The promises of genomics are therefore twofold, concerning themselves both with technoscientific possibilities and with expressing promises that are inscribed within the genome itself. In Fortun's words, "Being promising . . . is a fundamental aspect of the being of that favorite model organism of genomicists, a human." On the one hand, then, the promise is "ubiquitous and unavoidable," whether in language (as Fortun shows through reading Derrida), in the market (as he shows by reading corporate filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [Sec]), or in the body (as he shows by reading genomics). Indeed, that promising is not just a language game is evident in the ways in which promising is made a material necessity, in both genomics and in capital, by the law. Fortun traces how this process unfolded in hightech in the 1990s, especially the crucial role played by changes made by the Sec in 1995 to the safe-harbor provisions of forward-looking statements. These changes made it easier to protect forward-looking statements-which are statements released by companies that speak directly or indirectly to their revenue or growth potential in ways that could significantly influence investors-from anti-fraud litigation. The materialization of hype through changes in Sec provisions made hype both essential and legally mandated. Far from being deemed an act of irrational excess or dishonesty, hype became constitutive to the discourse of high-tech capital, in ways that were nontrivial and had consequences-not least for ordinary Icelandic investors in the stock market.
Situations of commitment and indebtedness within families are the explicit themes of Chloe Silverman's chapter, "Desperate and Rational: Of Love, Biomedicine, and Experimental Community." Silverman writes about the ways in which family, kinship, and commitment are all evident in autism research. Autism constitutes a poorly understood, untreatable spectrum of disorders; therefore, when parent-advocates of children with these disorders call for treatment, their requests seem like desperation. In the process of making such calls, parents of autism-afflicted children frame the disorder as biomedical, thereby rendering it potentially treatable. This forcible rendering of a condition as biomedical has interestingly different resonances in the case of autism than it does in the context of bipolar disorder as addressed in Lakoff 's chapter. While in the latter case, biomedicine constitutes the hegemonic discourse of global capital and reductive, corporate-driven genome science, in the setting of autism it is biomedicine that forms the "alternative" discourse.
Silverman's chapter traces the way in which this biomedical knowledge is produced in parent-practitioner communities. Empirically, it is an account of a parent advocacy project, Defeat Autism Now! (DAN!). If Michael Fortun's chapter described a political economy of hype, then Silverman's describes what Carlos Novas and Nikolas Rose (2004) refer to as a "political economy of hope." What Silverman shows is the parents' faith and investment in biomedicine, a particularly desperate and irrational kind of faith in reason and rationality. They hold a belief that biomedical experimentation will provide therapeutic outcomes for their suffering children, but this can only come about if parents-many of whom are outside the circuits of expertise that constitute the institutions of biomedicine-are involved in bringing about such experimentation themselves (either through funding, or advocacy, or collaborations with researchers, or in some cases, through getting involved themselves in science). Their faith in science is entwined with the love that animates this faith. Faith and love here are not opposed to objectivity, but rather are involved in the creation of new forms of objectivity.
Such familial investment is hardly innocent or painless. Indeed, it involves making the child an object of therapeutic experimentation, with all the risks that attend such subjection. Questions concerning such experimentation are simultaneously epistemic and political. Choices are being made and research agendas are being set, but by agents who do not fall into the categories of actors-scientific or corporate-who normally are vested with the authority to do so. One of the promissory terrains here therefore involves the reconstitution of expertise, thereby potentially leading not just to new therapies for autism, but also possibly reconstituting the very grounds of biomedical knowledge production.30 Michael Fischer's chapter, "Lively Biotech and Translational Research," concerns itself with experimental epistemology, institutional development, and the "peopling" of technoscience. It is written as a memorial to the late Harvard researcher Judah Folkman, one of the pioneers of angiogenesis research, which came to have significant applications in the development of anticancer therapies. Fischer begins by narrating Folkman's "Decalogue," an account of the multiple challenges involved in translating experimental research into the clinic.
But there are other sorts of translations, and translational challenges, which are at play in the different tracks of Fischer's narrative, for example, interdisciplinary translations between experimental and informational science; institutional translations between laboratory and market; the translation of skills between mentors and students, or between laboratories; global circulations of knowledge through the mobility of graduate students and postdoctoral researchers; and transnational translations that are occurring through these circulations, as well as through institutional endeavors (especially in Asia) to create new types of collaborative alliances that are not necessarily centered on the traditionally powerful research centers of the West. Hence, while earlier chapters in the volume (such as Tanner's and Peterson's) focus on the dispossession that is constitutive to the operation of technocapital, the Fortuns's, Silverman's, and Fischer's chapters open up the question of technocapital's experimental nature and promissory potential. This promise is not simply articulated as a glorious narrative of inevitable innovation, but rather is worked through in terms of the constitutive opportunities and challenges that are inherent in working within these promissory arenas for its practitioners.
Fischer shows that the investments in emergent epistemic, institutional, and "peopled" forms of the life sciences are not just financial or epistemic, but also speak to individual biographical histories of migration, reflect different national sentiments and scientific priorities, and call not just on structural constraints, but also on affect, aesthetics, and a whole range of tacit skills-what might be considered, following Choy's chapter, a "poetics" of lively biotech and translational research. But these stories are not merely contingent; they speak to larger structural and historical issues. For instance, why are certain research initiatives privileged over others? When? By whom? What are the implications, for instance, of Fischer's account (through a conversation with a Chinese postdoc based in the United States) of agricultural biotechnology falling "out of the loop" in the United States, such that cutting-edge work, where the fame and profit are to be found, ends up being almost entirely in the domain of biomedicine? If the life sciences, among other things, claim to provide us with knowledge about what it means to be human, then who gets to decide what kinds of work end up enabling or representing those claims? And how do these decisions operate in the spaces and double-binds that exist between the structural and the improvisational, the expropriative and the promissory, between "what we have been or what we will be" (Derrida 2002), the lively spaces of technocapital, which are also the spaces for the emergence and contestation of the epistemological, the ethical, and the political? notes which is regarded in many ways as a gold standard in strategic university technology licensing.
5. I draw extensively on Feldman, Colaianni, and Liu 2007 in this account of Stanford's rDt licensing strategy.
6. In Biocapital, I have argued for the importance of staying attentive to what Rosemary Coombe refers to as an "ethics of contingency with respect to commodified social texts" (Coombe 1998, 5; Sunder Rajan 2006). This was in response to the unfolding politics around DNA patents, which were broadly condemned as the ultimate signifier of the commercialization of the life sciences (reflecting, as it were, the commercialization of "life itself "). What did such a position signify, I wondered, when major proponents for gene patenting included patient-advocacy groups for rare genetic diseases, who argued that being about able to take out patents on gene sequences expressed in such diseases was one of the few mechanisms to ensure that they could have some control and direction over research into these diseases; and when major opponents of gene patenting included big multinational pharmaceutical companies, who did not want their downstream product development fettered by upstream property rights and licensing arrangements?
7. For Merton's normative structure of science, consisting of the four norms of universality, disinterestedness, communism, and organized skepticism, see Merton 1942.
8. Indeed, one can see this trajectory, wherein deep contestation regarding the very grounds of capitalization gives way to a more naturalized acceptance of such capitalization (even if the mechanisms and strategies of capitalization are varied), in other parts of the world more recently. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, as the Indian state pushed its scientific establishment to become more entrepreneurial in its approach, I noted debates in India similar to those that had taken place in the United States in the 1970s.
9. For Paul Rabinow's development of an idea of method adequate to the anthropology of the contemporary, see, for instance, Rabinow 2003. Rabinow's use of the concept of assemblage, derived from Gilles Deleuze, is relevant here (Rabinow 1999). Rabinow defines assemblages as contingent articulations of heterogenous elements; and it is the mapping of these contingencies that Rabinow sees as important for what he calls concept work. An elaboration of thinking with assemblages as a methodological solution to what they call "anthropological problems" is provided by Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier in their introduction to Global Assemblages (Ong and Collier 2005). Jasanoff 's idea of co-production is something that forces us to go beyond the contingent as explanation or solution; and Jasanoff herself, while deeply attendant to the contingent and the particular, should not be misread in a manner that simply allows one to substitute complex contingency for co-production.
10. The best-known example of Weber's method in action as relevant to this argument is, of course, his analysis of the relationship between religion and capitalism in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2008) . For Weber's elucidation of the ideal type and its role in sociological method, see Weber 1978.
11. Engels letter to Bloch, 1890 (Engels 1972 (Engels [1895 ). I am grateful to Dominic coideum. Around the time I was finishing my degree, in 1996-97, the lab I worked in adopted a new method called rNA differential display. What differential display allowed was the ability to study gene expression in two different samples (say, between a wild-type and mutant slime mould) in a single experiment. This study of differential gene expression could allow a comparison of the functioning of certain genes in different states (for example, between different tissues, or between different stages of development within a single cell type, or to look at whether a gene is turned on or off in particular situations of stress or disease). However, one already had to know which gene one was interested in to start with; and such a project could constitute an entire doctoral dissertation. Within the next three years, however, high-throughput technologies such as the Affymetrix DNA chip had been developed, which allowed one to compare two entire genomes of interest for differential DNA expression in a single experiment. For example, a major early publication that showed the utility of the Affymetrix chip used it to differentiate acute myelogenous leukemia from acute lymphocytic leukemia (Golub et al. 1999 ). This was a landmark paper because it enabled the classification of these two cancers based on the differential gene expression patterns of fifty genes, without any prior biological knowledge. Normally, tumor classification would require clinical, pathological, and cytological analysis. Classifying these cancers is of crucial importance in choosing the right treatment regimen, and the regimens for these two types of leukemia vary considerably. Often cells that follow different clinical courses look similar in biopsies, and traditional diagnosis of one or the other form of leukemia requires a complicated battery of tests. The DNA chip enabled this form of cancer diagnosis to move away from systems based on visual analysis to molecular-based systems, and in this experiment, allowed the comparative measurement of activities of nearly seven thousand genes expressed in bone marrow samples from thirty-eight patients. In other words, one moved very quickly from a stage of studying the expression of a single gene that was limited by how much prior information one had about that gene, to a stage where one could study the expression of seven thousand genes without any prior information about each of them. This scaling up was entirely consequent to the development of informatics capabilities that could generate and process large amounts of data very quickly. 26. This speaks to Jasanoff 's crucial departure from Latour's actor-network methodology. While Latour's diagnosis of the moves of purification that underlie the modernist enterprise remain valid in both the U.S. and Canadian cases that Jasanoff traces, the fact remains that the status of biotech patenting has emerged as significantly different in the two locales. This reflects the importance of Jasanoff 's insistence on comparative methodology even within studies of advanced liberal societies, which has threaded through all of her work but is clearly explicated in the context of biotechnology policy in Designs on Nature (Jasanoff 2005a 
